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1 Introduction
Everyone who has contributed to this Bulletin
agrees that the publication of WDR97 has changed
external perceptions of the attitude of the World
Bank towards the role of government in develop-
ment. To caricature a little, it seems that the Bank
has shifted from a state-sceptical to a state-friendly
stance: governments are now seen to be very
important, and the priority is to make them work
better, rather than cutting them back. That shift in
itself represents a move towards consensus. The
deep scepticism about the motives for and conse-
quences of state action, that coloured Bank atti-
tudes towards the state during the 1980s and early
1990s, was always a minority position. lt was
rooted above all in the discipline of economics and
in American political culture. It is encouraging to
find in WDR97 summaries of public opinion sur-
veys that indicate how different Americans are from
most peoples of the world in their scepticism
about, and distrust of, government (p.111). The
Bank has not shifted all the way from state-scepti-
cism to that esteem and respect for the state per se
that we associate above all with France, America's
only serious contemporary rival as a self-confident
missionary political culture with aspirations to re-
make other parts of the world in its own image. In
WDR97, state action is always justified instrumen-
tally, in terms of the benefits to human welfare it
can bring about, rather than through transcenden-
tal arguments about the inherent value of the state
as guardian and embodiment of a people, culture
or tradition. That instrumentalist position is prob-
ably the best one from which to engage the atten-
tion of the great majority of us, who are neither
deeply sceptical of nor deeply attached to the state
in principle.
The previous paragraph hints at both my initial -
in some senses my final - answer to the question I
set out to answer here: does WDR97 provide us
with a useful consensus about the role of govern-
ment in development? It does represent the basis
for a reasonable working consensus, not so
much by providing specific policy conclusions
on which we can all agree - the Report itself
makes few such claims - but rather by provid-
ing a language, a perspective, and a set of con-
cepts and concerns which will make it easier [or
people with divergent views actually to debate
and discuss with one another in a productive
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way. I identify below some elements of this consen-
sual framework. But let me first note that there is a
price to be paid for this degree of consensus. That
price is levied in two main forms:
The adoption of an eclectic perspective,
based on picking good ideas from many sources,
leaves the Report without a clear, unified per-
spective on how to think about governance prob-
lems, and without any 'default mode' practical
answers to actual policy questions. The Report
tells us: 'This is how you should think about issue
X, and this about issue Y', not 'This is how you
should think in general about governance issues',
and, even less, not 'This is probably the best policy
response to issue X'. I do not see this approach as a
problem; it appears to me to be the only practically
useful stance for a document with this breadth of
ambition. The eclecticism is usefully supplemented
in the final pages (pp.162-7) with a brief regional
panorama, that indicates the main governance
issues faced in different regions of the
developing/transitional world. More important, a
number of sections provide practical frameworks
for examining specific policy issues that should be
directly helpful to policy advisors. I was impressed
in particular by the detailed discussions of regula-
tion, especially financial regulation, in Chapter 4;
by the analysis in Chapter 5 of the advantages, dis-
advantages and prerequisites for governments to
rely more on contracting out and other quasi-mar-
ket mechanisms for public service delivery; and by
the detailed examination of decentralisation, mainly
from a fiscal perspective, in Chapter 7.
The drawing of a veil over the extent to
which the causes and remedies of poor gover-
nance in developing and transitional countries
lie outside their own frontiers. That is the theme
developed in the final section of this article.
The consequences of the eclecticism of WDR97, the
dearth of clear, specific, universal policy prescrip-
tions, and the continuing sense of 'alienation' that it
may generate among some readers from developing
countries, may be that the Report will generate
more interest among those with an intellectual con-
cern for development policy issues than among pol-
icymakers themselves. That does not mean it will be
any less influential in the long term. lt may achieve
influence through forging more of a consensus
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among the staff of the Bank itself, and the penum-
bra of researchers and consultants who work
around it. To see why that is the case it is useful to
look more specifically at a list of issues where
WDR97 appears to embody, or at least move
towards, a useful, non-trivial consensus about the
state and development.
2 Points of Consensus
(i) From New Political Economy to New
Institutional Economics
The World Bank has never been an ideological
monolith; it is however subject to, and purveyor of,
intellectual fashions. In the 1980s, the Bank was
one of the most influential proponents of what was
then termed the New Political Economy (NPE).
NPE constituted an important component of the
broader neo-liberal paradigm that was then preva-
lent. In essence, NPE was a method of analysing
politics using the procedures and models of eco-
nomics, notably the assumption that people engage
in political and public action principally in pursuit
of material self-interest, and that they pursue this in
politics according to the same rationalistic behav-
ioural calculus that is believed to guide behaviour
in market situations. Given the initial assumptions,
applied NPE inevitably 'exposed' the material self-
interest that 'really' lay behind public action.
Politicians imposed import tariffs because they were
in the pay of local industrialists who benefited from
protection; governments introduced environmental
protection laws so that bureaucrats and politicians
could get bribes from businesses seeking exemp-
tions, etc. NPE was the perfect intellectual tool to
accompany the neo-liberal agenda, for it was virtu-
ally guaranteed to generate a 'finding' that could be
used to justify cutting back the state in some sense
or other: lowering taxation, shrinking the public
sector, reducing the discretion and autonomy
enjoyed by politicians and public servants, or scrap-
ping regulation.
Few people doubt that NPE does usefully reveal
aspects of reality - but no more. lt does not provide
a comprehensive understanding of politics and
public action, and is systematically biased in its pol-
icy implications. It has been losing intellectual
ground as the novelty has worn off and the limita-
tions of the paradigm have become clearer. NPE still
has adherents in the Bank, and appears fairly
prominently in WDR97. There is a classic reasser-
tion of the core assumptions of NPE on pp. 49-5 0.
lt is the dominant influence on the content of
Chapter 9, about the political economy of (eco-
nomic) reform, probably to the detriment of the
analysis. For much of the recent research on the
political economy of (economic) reform has empha-
sised that the NPE approach is seriously flawed
because one of its core assumptions is seldom ful-
filled: the notion that people have, and believe
themselves to have, an accurate understanding of
the likely implications of economic reform for their
own economic prospects. Much of the time, eco-
nomic reform involves such radical changes in eco-
nomic structures and relationshïps that most
people, including well-informed businesspeople,
feel unable to judge whether and through what
mechanisms they will be among the 'winners' or the
'losers'. They are therefore unable to pursue rational
material self-interest. In such circumstances, behav-
iour is shaped less by the informed rational calculus
underlying the NPE model than by more instinctual
and/or socially determined and therefore malleable
judgements about whose views on economic policy
are to be trusted, and which leader appears most
likely to steer the country safely through the rough
and unknown waters of economic liberalisation
(Bates 1993; Powers and Cox 1997).
We need not, however, continue to flail away at the
limitations of NPE, at least in the context of
WDR97. For it has been succeeded here - as in
much other recent Bank documentation and in
academia more generally - by the New Institutional
Economics (NIE). NIE, associated with the names
of the academics Coase, North and Williamson,
developed on the foundation of the observation that
mainstream economics had ignored, at considerable
cost in terms of realism, the issue of what we now
call 'transactions costs'. The normal assumptions of
mainstream economics had been that transactions
between economic actors are relatively costless:
they have to expend few resources in finding out
about one another, negotiating, ensuring that each
kept to a bargain, that goods and services were of
the correct quality, etc. Once economists began to
take seriously the possibility that transactions costs
could be high, not only did the traditional intellec-
tual edifice of economics begin to look vulnerable
to deep criticism but, more important for our pur-
poses, issues of social and public order became
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central to economists' concerns, ceasing to be
peripheral considerations that could safely be
assumed away NIE is not intrinsically state-friendly
It is however order-friendly It emphasises the eco-
nomic benefits of: institutional arrangements that
help bring down transactions costs; transparent,
effective, accessible legal and judicial mechanisms;
reliable, stable financial systems; the 'credibility' of
government policies; the general stability and pre-
dictability of the institutional and policy environ-
ment; and a range of other services and practices
that are, in most circumstances, best provided
directly by governments or by non-government
organisations dependent on government support of
some kind.
NIE thus in practice helps direct attention to the
effectiveness of states, and represents a move away
from the NPE focus on minimising the role and size
of states in relation to the non-state economy NIE
(New Institutional Economics) also has another,
more subtle effect on the tone and content of debate
about the state. A core concept is institutions: insti-
tutions for making markets more effective by low-
ering transactions costs. Quite what is meant by
'institutions' is not clear. All definitions constitute
some variation on the standard sociological defini-
tion of an institution as a 'recurring pattern of
behaviour', often with some qualification about
being 'socially valued' or useful. All these defini-
tions are so broad and diffuse that they exclude lit-
tle; 'institution' becomes almost equivalent to 'a
good thing'. However, this focus on institutions has
the great advantage of making it at least appear that
economists are interested in the same kinds of
things as the other social science disciplines - soci-
ology, political science, organisation theory, social
anthropology - that use the term liberally In atti-
tude as well as in substance, the 'institutionalism' of
NIE makes it easier for economists to talk to other
disciplines. For example, non-economists would
not normally describe the advantages of public-pri-
vate national policy deliberation councils as fol-
lows: 'By embedding the voice of powerful interest
groups in mutually acceptable rules, publicprivate
deliberation councils can reduce transactions costs
by reducing the scope for opportunistic behaviour'
(p.117). However, it only requires a little translation
effort to get the point; and that is an effort many of
us will be prepared to make, if that is the only way
to get World Bank economists to talk sensibly about
the real world without fear of losing professional
face.'
Although WTDR97 is theoretically and conceptually
eclectic, institutionalism and NIE comprise the
most prominent single perspective (see especially
Chapters 3 and 5), and provide a benign, state-
friendly perspective that contrasts markedly with
the state-scepticism of the New Political Economy
A wide range of social scientists who are sceptical or
antagonistic to New Political Economy can respond
positively to an agenda couched in terms of New
Institutional Economics.
(ii) Taking political science seriously
Unlike economics, political science does not have a
single dominant paradigm. Political scientists rou-
tinely differ in their approaches to the most basic
issues with which they deal, including the question
of the nature of states. (Are states basically mecha-
nisms of domination? If so, who dominates and in
what interest? Or are they basically mechanisms for
the achievement of collective, societal goals?) To
date, the only paradigm for the study of politics to
have shaped World Bank analyses is the New
Political Economy - but NPE owes more to eco-
nomics than to political science (see above).
WDR97 takes a substantial step forward in accept-
ing that there are valid perspectives and concerns
within political science beyond the narrow perspec-
tives of the New Political Economy There is no
explicit statement of what has been taken into
WDR97 from political science; it is as much a mat-
ter of tone as of content. A political science per-
spective is implicit at some points and explicit at
others, notably in Chapter 9 on the politics/political
economy of reform. While, as mentioned above,
Chapter 9 is mainly shaped by the New Political
Economy, serious attention is paid to a major polit-
ical science, rather than political economy, variable:
that is, the ways in which the organisational config-
uration of the state affects the scope for and fate of
reforms.
By trying to take political science seriously, the
authors of WDR97 have exposed themselves to
both (a) the lack of basic consensus among political
See also the argument on p.116 that 'popular voice
can reduce information problems and lower transactions
costs'.
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scientists on their analytic paradigms and (b) the
limitations of the discipline as a source of direct
policy advice. The discussion of the politics/politi-
cal economy of reform in Chapter 9 begins to look
like an attempt to implicate political scientists in the
old joke about economists: that, if six economists
were laid end-to-end, they would still point in all
directions. Chapter 9 advances in a positive fashion
the plausible argument that certain moments,
including perceived national crises and honeymoon
periods of new governments, are especially suitable
for implementing difficult reforms. However,
research fails to confirm this, and we finally learn
that political science does not clearly indicate why
reforming appears to be so much easier in some cir-
cumstances than others (pp.150i). The same
chapter tells us, reasonably enough, that a political
system with many 'veto points' has some in-built
checks on the expansion of the state sector (good),
but is also likely to be especially resistant to reform
(bad). The large literature on political science does
not provide answers to these kinds of questions that
can feed immediately into policy And it actually has
little to say over a set of issues that is of especial
concern to WDR97: how to prevent the complete
collapse of states in the manner of Somalia and
Sierra Leone, and how to put them back together
again.2
The treatment of the issue of corruption in Chapter
6 of WDR97 illustrates in a vivid way the potential
pitfalls for the World Bank in becoming so overtly
'political'. It is difficult for the Bank to strike the
right balances, whether political-diplomatic or ana-
lytical. There is a problem on the political-diplo-
matic front because the arguments advanced about
the prevalence and consequences of corruption
would have lacked persuasiveness if not backed by
examples. The solution was (a) to make frequent
approving mention of anti-corruption efforts; (b) to
give the usual prominence to historical examples of
rampant corruption in the US (p.102 and p.105),
presumably to demonstrate freedom from any cul-
tural bias while avoiding the risk of upsetting the
current US Congress; and (c) to point the finger of
guilt mainly at cases and countries that have little
capacity to react: Malta, Pakistan and Ukraine
The discussion of these issues (WDR97: 158-62) is as
pragmatically sensible as any I have seen. However, it
appears to owe little to academic political science.
(p.100). The current regimes known to be tainted
by serious corruption but endowed with capacity to
retaliate against the Bank - from the US across to
China, with many in between - naturally receive no
mention. To expect anything else would be naive.
The point is worth mention because the credibility
of the Report's presentation of the corruption issue
cannot be divorced from the credibility of its analy-
sis. And that analysis, while far from naive or sim-
plistic, is open to challenge.
lt is a testimony to the intellectual independence of
the WDR team that they did not adopt a blanket
stance against corruption of all kinds, but made a
distinction between 'predictable' and 'unpre-
dictable' corruption - the latter having the more
adverse developmental consequences (p.103).
Making that distinction constitutes a risk for the
World Bank: any talk that might be taken to indi-
cate that some corruption is 'tolerable' could under-
mine the effort that the Bank has made to gear itself
up to tackle the corruption issue.3 But it was neces-
sary to recognise varieties of corruption if the
Report was to be analytically credible: as the
authors observe, 'some countries that rank high in
surveys of the level of corruption have also excelled
in economic growth' (p.103). The WDR team have
dealt with this by using survey data that they accu-
mulated themselves from 39 countries to show that
development, defined as gross investment rates, is
greatest when corruption is both lowest and most
predictable (Figure 6.1). Readers will excuse my
scepticism about the reliability of the argument. It is
based on averages for four groups of countries,
where corruption is respectively: low and pre-
dictable; low and unpredictable; high and pre-
dictable; high and unpredictable. We know that
many development variables interact with many
others, and that the fact that variable A tends to be
correlated with variable B in cross-national samples
is no evidence that they even directly affect one
another. And the data on the incidence of corrup-
tion, based as it is on a set of opinion surveys of pri-
vate sector business, must be treated with some
reserve. Do I detect similar reservations about the
conclusions in the Report itself, which goes on to
say: 'Countries that have so far achieved high rates
of economic growth despite serious corruption may
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find themselves paying a higher price in future'
(p.103). Warning sinners that they will suffer for
their misdeeds in the next world suggests resigned
acceptance of the fact that are enjoying the fruits of
sin in this one.
My major quarrel with the analysis of corruption is
not however about numbers. It is rather that, hav-
ing raised in a serious way the issue of 'types of cor-
ruption', the Report deals with it in an economistic
fashion, and fails to indicate that some political sci-
entists have a different, possibly more policy-rele-
vant analytical approach. Let me illustrate this in
relation to Japan, the star in the post-World War
Two economic firmament, but a country whose pol-
itics are, at some levels, riddled with corruption:
'First-rate economy; third-rate politics' (Woodall
1996: 3). The point lies in the phrase 'at some lev-
els'. The leading, internationally competitive sectors
of the Japanese economy have been largely insu-
lated from clientelism and corruption. lt is in rela-
tion to these sectors that Japan Inc. manifests itelf:
the admired senior public service; the sense of a
common national project; productive co-operation
between sectors of private business and state agen-
cies, etc. By contrast, the non-traded, protected sec-
tors - notably agriculture, distribution and
retailing, public works - are enmeshed in corrupt,
clientelistic networks that incorporate public ser-
vants, politicians, voters and interest groups and
consume many public resources (Woodall 1996).
The Japan case suggests a lesson for rulers that is
more practical than 'try to make your corruption
predictable'; it is: 'try to stamp corruption out from
key economic sectors, and permit it elsewhere so
that you can reap the political benefits without
doing major economic harm'.
But I can already hear other political scientists dis-
agreeing with me. That takes us back to the point of
departure: in taking political science seriously, the
World Bank opens itself to endless dispute among
political scientists themselves.
(iii) A new approach to the public sector
and public sector reform
The treatment of the related issues of public sector
reform and the organisation of the public sector in
The World Bank more recent 'manifesto' on and patterns of corruption (World Bank 1997: 14-17).
corruption is even more open about the possible causes
WDR97 is impressive. There is little here that is
strictly new to specialists inside or outside the
Bank; most of the ideas have been in the air for
some years at least. However, they are put together
such that they add up to an approach that is both
distinctive and plausible. Partly because the key
ideas are scattered - mainly in chapters 5 and 7 -
no two readers are likely to summarise them in
exactly the same way I was particularly struck by
the following:
The endorsement of the argument that the
World Banks public sector reform specialists have
been making privately: that the conventional
approach to this issue has not worked (pp.95-6).
The conventional approach comprises essentially
five steps: a public service census; the establishment
of a central register of information about public ser-
vice employees; the elimination from salary rolls of
'ghost workers'; compensated redundancies for
excess workers; and use of the resultant 'savings' to
increase salaries for the remaining staff, beginning
with 'decompression', i.e. higher salaries for senior
staff. This strategy, that has often involved large fee
payments for foreign consultants, has in most cases
simply foundered in the face of the opposition of
public service employees and their unions. It is
helpful that WDR97 makes it clear that continuing
to bash heads against brick walls is not a good idea,
however compelling the argument that the walls
need to come down. We do not have an agreed
alternative approach to public sector reform, and
WDR97 does not offer us one. There is, however, a
widespread view that a more co-operative strategy
in relation to public service workers and unions is
more likely to move governments toward their
goals.
The strong support - that in part echoes and
reflects the conclusions of the Bank's 1993 'East
Asian Miracle' study into the secrets of East Asian
economic success - for 'public service fundamen-
tals': meritocratic recruitment and promotion;
rewarding pay, especially at senior levels; the auton-
omy of public service from routine political inter-
ference; and the need for strong policy formulation
capacity at senior levels (Chapter 5). This is a con-
siderable advance over the Banks 1992 statement
on 'Governance and Development', that was silent
on these critical issues (Moore 1993: 41). The case
was much strengthened by drawing on the recent
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research organised by Peter Evans and James Rauch
that provides the kind of evidence likely to appeal
especially to Bank economists: that attention to
these 'public service fundamentals' is associated
with better economic performance over a wide
cross-national sample. Given the general orienta-
tion of the World Bank in favour of market solu-
tions to public policy issues, it is both a little
surprising and pleasing that its public sector man-
agement specialists have always been cautious
about the Anglo-American-New Zealand enthusi-
asm for the New Public Management - the pro-
gramme to introduce market surrogates,
competition and contracting into public adminis-
tration. WDR97 is very balanced about the New
Public Management, pointing out above all that it
will not work until the more fundamental problems
of weak states are tackled first: poor quality of pub-
lic service staff; lack of meritocratic practices; per-
sonal and financial indiscipline and corruption; and
absence of accountability (pp.87-9 and 96-8).
The recognition that questions of morale and
esprit de corps are often central to good public sec-
tor work performance, that these concerns are often
neglected by reformers focused too narrowly on pay
issues, and that there is considerable scope to
improve public sector performance by paying atten-
tion to questions of morale (pp.92-8).
More generally, what I would term an 'intelligent
eclectic' approach to issues of public sector organi-
sation (p.7). The reader will find the following mes-
sages: none of the doctrinally shaped approaches to
this issue (e.g. New Public Management) will con-
tribute more than elements of a solution; there are a
wide range of positive experiences from all cate-
gories of country (e.g. Ceara state in Northeast
Brazil) from which useful lessons may be learned;
and that there are some simple conceptual schemas
(e.g. Figure 5.4 on p.87 and Table 5.1 on p.88) that
are very helpful in thinking analytically and practi-
cally about how to tackle concrete questions. I can-
not think of an important, relevant piece of
analytical or research work on public sector organ-
isation and management that conspicuously has
been neglected in preparing WDR97.
(iv) Conceding industrial policy
The outdated 'states versus markets' debate that
WDR97 consciously attempts to leave behind
(p.25) revolved above all around different
approaches to industrial policy To summarise
crudely, 'statists' argued that poor countries could
and should pursue activist industrial policies,
designed to promote particular sectors, technolo-
gies, products or processes, while neo-liberals
argued for strict hands-off and neutrality, on the
grounds that 'state intervention' would generally
make things worse. The main battle over this issue
in the World Bank was fought in the early 1990s,
under the stimulus of Japanese government funding
of the 'East Asian Miracle Study'. That study con-
ceded that, in some circumstances, industrial policy
of the type advocated by statists had been effective.
The debate then shifted to a more nitty-gritty level:
in what circumstances could different types of
industrial policy be effective? The general formula-
tions in the 'East Asian Miracle Study' did not
resolve those questions. I think WDR97 leaves us in
about the same general position (pp.72-5). By
locating the question in a chapter focused mainly
on economic regulation, the authors have
attempted to direct attention to pragmatic questions
about relative state capacity Their distinction
between three different categories of industrial pol-
icy - 'investment coordination, network thickening,
and picking winners' (p.72) - is practically helpful.
But there remains considerable latitude to disagree
about what the authors' 'real' conclusions are.
(y) Balance about civil society
Since 'civil society' in Eastern Europe was seen to be
directly responsible for the massive political
changes that began there in 1989, the concept has
dominated much discussion about development
issues. It has been heavily promoted by develop-
ment NGOs, whose funding has grown fast until
recently, and who have often been very happy to
identify themselves as the organisational embodi-
ment of 'civil society'. WDR97 appears to have
struck a reasonable balance between (a) recognising
the potential benefits of strengthening civil society
in relation to the state and (b) scepticism about the
more extreme claims on behalf of development
NGOs and the misplaced notion that civil society
organisations generally arise, thrive, and contribute
to well-being independently of any support from or
co-operation with state agencies (Chapter 7). This is
all of a piece with the insistence on the costs as well
as the benefits of that other great panacea,
decentralisation (p.11).
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(vi) Combining a soft heart and a hard
head
The World Bank is generally outflanked by other
UN agencies, notably UNICEF and UNDI in overt
concern for the poor and expressed distaste for eco-
nomic and social inequality per se. The implicit
competition is manifested in the increased
resources that the Bank and UNDP put into prepar-
ing and publicising their respective annual lead
publications, the 'World Development Report'
(Bank) and the 'Human Development Report'
(UNDP). The Bank, financed through borrowing on
the world's capital markets, could not afford to
adopt the same 'welfareist' stances as organisations
like UNDP and UNICEF, that are grant-funded.
However indirectly, the Bank is ultimately con-
cerned about the state and governance because it
needs reliable, viable states to take its loans and
either repay them or guarantee that they will be
repaid. It would not, therefore, have been surpris-
ing if WDR97 had ended up being hard-hearted
about the state, and the imperatives of governance,
revenue, and efficient use of public resources, to the
exclusion of serious concerns about poverty and
inequality It certainly does not focus on these issues
of poverty and inequality to the same extent as the
Human Development Reports. And even a hard-
hearted political scientist might argue that WDR97
does not give a strong enough message that deep
socio-economic inequality is itself a major reason
why some states are regarded as illegitimate by
many of their citizens, and thus a cause of civil and
political unrest and of poor governance. However,
WDR97 does make a set of powerful, soft-hearted
arguments from a hard-headed perspective: the
cases that (a) a great deal of public spending on
health, education, housing and other social services
is inefficiently concentrated on the non-poor, and
needs to be distributed more equitably even in
terms of the logic of efficiency; and (b) that many
governments of poor countries simply need to
spend more on health and education (Chapter 3,
p.52).
3 Some Potential Points of
Difference and Controversy
I list below four concerns about the content of
WDR. They are inter-related. All in some way con-
cern the international dimensions of questions of
governance in poor countries. The most general
point is that these international dimensions have
been neglected andlor unsatisfactorily treated. One
consequence is that the actual contributions of rich
countries and 'the international system' to causing
these governance problems is glossed over.
Is WDR backward looking?
The nature, extent and rate of globalisation, and the
implications for the power and autonomy of the
national state, are among the most hotly-debated
public issues of our time. Let us simply note that
those people who take the globalisation thesis seri-
ously will find at least two reasons to suggest that
WDR97 has focused too much on the past and not
enough on the future. One is that the focus on the
potential for abuse of state power may now be
somewhat dated, on the grounds that states are los-
ing power to international capital markets and to
the 'controllers of capital'.4 The other is that eco-
nomic globalisation is already bringing increased
economic volatility and insecurity - and, probably,
inequality - to much of the world's population; that
this is likely to have adverse social and political
consequences; and that states need to be strength-
ened to develop the capacity to protect and insure
their citizens against the worst instability without
undermining the positive economic consequences
of integration into global markets (Rodrik 1997).
Sharing the blame for poor
governance?
Leaving aside their specific content, World Bank
documents like WDR97 tend to attract criticism
and controversy for two broad reasons. One is that
they have an ambiguous status. They are not formal
policy statements, but give, and are intended to
give, strong signals about the Banks position. But it
is not always clear where these signals are directed.
Sometimes the implicit purpose is to try to convert
the Bank itself to a new position, while appearing to
talk only about what happens 'out there'. The other
reason is that these documents are almost entirely
non-reflective: they rarely comment on how the
Bank's own (quasi-formal) views have changed,
appearing to leave the Bank in the position of
always being the critic and the source of wisdom,
never the apologetic self-critic. There is certainly no
reflective self-criticism by the Bank in WDR97. In
other ways too it conveys the impression that
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responsibility and blame for poor governance lies
almost entirely within the boundaries of develop-
ing/transitional countries:
Leaving aside a much-merited but brief criticism
of aid donors on pp.83-84, there is scarcely any
discussion of the international dimensions of poor
governance. I briefly outline under point 3 below a
case that the international causes - and potential
remedies - are more significant than is implied in
WDR97.
The authors of WDR97 have paid little heed to
the conservative tendency within the World Bank
that is worried that its growing involvement in gov-
ernance issues leaves it vulnerable to a legal chal-
lenge that it has exceeded its mandate by becoming
involved in overtly 'political' issues. Instead, the
Report is fairly littered with references to specific
country experiences and lessons, some respectful
and admiring, other neutral and factual, but many
distinctly unflattering and liable to generate antago-
nism: the references to the enormous size of extra-
budgetary funds in Nigeria (p.83), the large number
of cabinet ministers in the Cameroon, Malawi and
Senegal (p.l50), and the ways in which the govern-
ments of Malta, Pakistan and the Ukraine exercise
executive influence over judicial decisions (p.100).
There are reasons to welcome such transparency
and openness: if the World Bank is to become more
involved in making political judgements, let it be
explicit. Also, the view could be taken that the
influence of aid donors, the World Bank and other
international financial institutions is, in any case, in
decline as private capital flows to poor countries
increasingly dwarf diminishing aid resources
(except for much of Africa), and that it is pragmati-
cally sensible to focus on the potential remedies to
poor governance that lie within the grasp of devel-
oping countries themselves, side-stepping the role
of 'international' influences. However, there are at
least two groups of people who will not rest content
with the implicit 'blame-and-reponsibility-lies
within-developing-countries' stance: those who see
the international dimension as central to explaining
and remedying poor governance in low income
countries (see below); and those who refuse to read
WDR97 as a stand-alone document, and would like
For an extensive review of recent literature on this topic, see Cohen (1996).
to see the World Bank discuss its own responsibil-
ity for the problems it diagnoses. Whether and how
the Bank is actually responsible for those problems
is of course highly contentious, and not a subject
that can easily be resolved here. However, it is likely
that many people will have a similar reaction to that
of one of my professional colleagues, who shall for
present purposes go unnamed:
By supporting the denigration of the public sec-
tor and the public service for so many years, the
Bank has contributed to loss of morale and thus
to the very problems that WDR97 now
addresses. The least it could have done is to
acknowledge that its own position and advice
on these issues has changed substantially
(iii) Is poor governance an 'internal'
problem?
In its discussion of state-as-bureaucratic-system,
WDR97 pays justified attention to the role of per-
formance incentives. There is some recognition of
the incentive issue when the state is viewed more as
a political system, notably the mention on p.l50 of
the role of external threat in encouraging govern-
ments to reform. However, as a political scientist, I
find that less importance has been paid to this issue
the issue of the incentives that shape the behav-
iour of government elites - than is needed if we are
to gain a fuller understanding of the underlying
causes of poor governance in some poor countries.
The simple fact is that many of the poorest and least
effective states have been 'externally-oriented' for
decades, often since their emergence as indepen-
dent states. By 'externally-oriented', I mean that the
governing elites have much more incentive to
please external agents (other states, large transna-
tional companies) than to build or maintain legiti-
macy among their own citizens. This is not -the
consequence of 'imperialist conspiracy', or simply
the result of the Cold War. It is a structural conse-
quence of underdevelopment: the existence of a
penumbra of poor states whose elites remain in
power through some combination of (a) military
support from wealthy states (b) large natural
resource based revenues, frequently managed by
transnational corporations, that leave them inde-
pendent of citizens-as-taxpayers, and (c), especially
over the last two decades, levels of development aid
exceeding half of government income that also shift
de facto accountability from citizens to aid donors.
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There is wide scope to debate what could be done
about this situation. I take the view that different
methods of aid giving can at least alleviate the per-
verse political consequences of very high levels of
aid dependence of weak states (Moore, forthcom-
ing). The general point here is that WDR97 pays
inadequate attention to the structural causes of poor
governance that arise from the international state
system. One might justify this on the grounds that
aid donors can do little, and developing countries
should be told that these are their problems. If how-
ever one believes that aid is currently part of the
problem and potentially part of the solution, the
case for silence on this issue is less strong.
(iv) The international system
WDR97 does devote one of its chapters (Chapter 8,
'Facilitating International Collective Action') to the
international dimensions of governance. That chap-
ter is unsatisfactory in two senses. First, it feels
rather 'thin': the discussions of international capital
flows, international co-operation in agricultural
research, refugees, aid and international environ-
mental policy are not engaging or exciting, and
indeed sound a little platitudinous. Second, the
underlying political paradigm is so different from
that underlying the remainder of the Report as to
provoke comment. There are two main explana-
tions within political science for the existence of
states. The critical view is that they are instruments
through which one section of the population dom-
inates and exploits the other. The establishment
view is that they are instruments for the achieve-
ment of collective goals. The issue is not posed in
these terms in WDR97, but in practice both para-
digms are represented: the New Political Economy
(see above) embodies one variant of the critical
vie while most of the discussion about policy is
predicated on the establishment assumption that
governments are there to make things better for all
of us.
If both critical and establishment views are valid in
relation to individual states and their relationships
to their citizens, should the same not be true of the
international, inter-state system? Should we not
expect to find that the co-operation and interactions
of states serve both to advance collective, global
interests and, at the same time, to advantage some
states more than others? Should not poorer, weaker
states be just as wary of the motives and behaviour
of those who dominate the international system as,
according to WDR97 and New Political Economy,
weaker citizens should be wary of those who dom-
inate their national states? And where does the
World Bank itself fit into the system? WDR97 dis-
cusses international collective action purely in
terms of collective gains.
What are we to make of all this? Just an oversight?
Too difficult to deal with? If I were from a develop-
ing country I would have probably picked up on a
pattern of discourse in WDR97 rather more quickly
than I did: causes and remedies to poor governance
lie out there in poor countries; rich and powerful
countries and influential international institutions
are either neutral or eager to be part of the solution
if they are permitted; they are rarely part of the
problem. What else would you expect the World
Bank to say? It already has enough problems with
the US Congress without provoking more. But, if it
is really these kinds of political pressures bearing on
the Bank that explain the limited and one-sided
treatment of the international dimensions of gover-
nance in WDR97, any consensus that it does
achieve will leave many people outside.
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